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STRENGTHENING OUR SECURITY: A NEW INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
ON TRADE-BASED MONEY LAUNDERING IS NEEDED NOW 
Ross S. Delston & Stephen C. Walls 
Recently, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) missed an      
opportunity to address trade-based money laundering (TBML) in its       
International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the         
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, known as the Forty                  
Recommendations. In mid-February 2012, the FATF incorporated the Nine 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing into its Forty             
Recommendations, yet chose not to revise the Forty Recommendations to 
specifically address TBML. Despite the serious and growing concern within 
the AML/CFT field and FATF over the widespread abuse of the              
international trade system to legitimize the proceeds of crime and finance 
terrorist activities, and the demonstrated ability of FATF to identify and 
respond to evolving money laundering typologies, TBML remains the only 
major avenue of money laundering that the FATF Forty Recommendations 
have not explicitly addressed. Because of the need for international action 
on TBML that reaches beyond banks, this article therefore proposes       
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. TBML Is Widely Regarded as a Global Threat 
Estimates for the amount of money laundering through the abuse of 
the international trade system range from $5 billion for Colombia alone1 to 
“hundreds of billions” worldwide.2 Trade-based money laundering (TBML) 
has been identified as a major issue in the popular press for almost twenty 
years,3 and has received significant attention in both the U.S. Congress and 
the Executive Branch since at least the late 1990s.4 The Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) first took note of TBML as a major avenue of money 
laundering in 2006 in its Report entitled Trade Based Money Laundering.5  
  
 1 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ET AL., 2007 NATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 7 app. at 
57 (2007) (noting the money laundering in connection with drug trafficking in Colombia); 
see also Oriana Zill & Lowell Bergman, The Black Peso Money Laundering System, 
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/blackpeso.html 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (citing Fanny Kertzman, former Director of Colombian Cus-
toms). 
 2 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 5 (2009). 
 3 See Oriana Zill & Lowell Bergman, U.S. Business & Money Laundering, FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/us.html (last visited Mar. 29, 
2012). 
 4 See The Black Market Peso Exchange – How U.S. Companies Are Used to Launder 
Money: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 106th Cong. (1999) [here-
inafter Black Market Peso Exchange Hearing] (statement of Bonni Tischler, Assistant 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs Service.). 
 5 FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], TRADE BASED MONEY LAUNDERING 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/25/37038272.pdf [hereinafter FATF TBML 
REPORT]. 
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TBML not only threatens legitimate businesses in both the          
developed and developing world by undermining legal import and export 
operations,6 it also impacts one of the largest sources of income for many 
developing countries—customs duties.7 Beyond the threats to legitimate 
businesses, economic development and the rule of law, the U.S. State     
Department and U.S. Treasury Department have directly linked TBML 
schemes with Hezbollah,8 the Afghanistan drug trade,9 and al-Qaeda.10  
Despite recognition of the widespread abuse of the international 
trade system to legitimize the proceeds of crime and finance terrorist      
activities, and the demonstrated ability of FATF to respond to evolving 
money laundering typologies,11 TBML remains the only one of three main 
avenues of money laundering12 that has not been addressed by specific   
language in the FATF Forty Recommendations. 
B. Legally Binding U.N. Conventions on International Crime and  
Corruption Require Action on TBML  
A December 2009 report from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), which analyzed the requirements of international instruments 
  
 6 See Shannon K. O’Neil, Trade-Based Money Laundering in Mexico, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., LATIN AMERICA’S MOMENT BLOG (Apr. 13, 2011), http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/ 
2011/04/13/trade-based-money-laundering-in-mexico/; see also Tod Robberson Traffickers 
Use U.S. Businesses, Cash Smuggling to Hide Billions in Profit, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2010), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=20011119&slug=drug 
trade19. 
 7 See, e.g., BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, 2 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 88 (2007) (stating that 
customs duties comprise “40–50 percent of annual Bangladesh government income.”). 
 8 Drug Investigations Lead to Treasury 311 Patriot Act Designation Against Lebanese 
Bank Tied to Hizballah, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www. 
justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr021011.html. 
 9 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 5 (2008) (“[T]here is increasing 
realization that . . . trade goods in Dubai and elsewhere are being purchased with Afghan 
drug proceeds. . . .”). 
 10 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 17 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 
INCSR]; e.g., John S. Zdanowicz, Trade Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 
5 REV. L. & ECON. 855, 867 (2009) (charting the abnormally high import prices from al-
Qaeda watch list countries and the abnormally low export prices from al-Qaeda watch list 
countries). 
 11 See FATF, NINE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING 2–3 (2001) 
[hereinafter NINE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media 
/fatf/documents/reports/9%20Special%20Recommendations.pdf. 
 12 See FATF TBML REPORT, supra note 5; see also FATF, BEST PRACTICES PAPER ON 
TRADE BASED MONEY LAUNDERING 1 (2008) [hereinafter FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES], 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/9/28/40936081.pdf. 
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addressing money laundering, found that, although neither relevant U.N. 
conventions nor the Forty Recommendations contain an “express           
obligation” to address TBML, TBML does fit under the broad obligations to 
combat money laundering contained in those conventions.13 The report 
states “to properly investigate money-laundering . . . the money-laundering 
offence needs to be defined broadly to include trade-based money-
laundering schemes” and goes on to say that:  
[T]he Organized Crime Convention, the Convention Against Corruption 
and the FATF recommendations require countries to identify, investigate 
and prosecute trade-based money laundering schemes, through both the 
monitoring of financial transactions and sharing of relevant trade data, 
[although] the provisions of the two conventions and the FATF recom-
mendations are rather general and give Member States little guidance on 
how best to implement their obligations.
14
  
C. FATF Missed Opportunities to Address TBML in 1996, 2003 and 
2012 
In February 2012, the FATF passed on its third major opportunity 
to address TBML in its Forty Recommendations.15 At that time, the FATF 
incorporated the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing16 
into the Forty Recommendations,17 yet chose not to revise the Forty       
Recommendations to include a new international standard on combating 
TBML.  
Although TBML is implicitly captured by the broad range of anti-
money laundering (AML) requirements in the relevant U.N. conventions,18 
the FATF has not provided explicit TBML requirements for its members. 
Even though the FATF drafted the original Forty Recommendations in 
1996, revised them in 2003, and again in 2012, and has addressed specific 
typologies and threats in those revisions,19 AML/CFT obligations regarding 
  
 13 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, International Cooperation to Address Money-
Laundering Based on Relevant United Nations and Other Instruments, Working Paper by the 
Secretariat, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.213/8 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. AML Report].  
 14 Id. at ¶ 36 (emphasis added). 
 15 See FATF Steps up the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 
FATF (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf 
stepsupthefightagainstmoneylaunderingandterroristfinancing.html (describing the actions 
taken at the Paris meeting).  
 16 See id.; NINE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11.  
 17 See generally FATF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 
(2012) [hereinafter FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 18 U.N. AML Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 35–37. 
 19 FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17.  
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TBML continue to lack specificity, possibly contributing to a limited global 
response to TBML threats to date by national and international authorities.20 
This brief article therefore proposes original language for a 41
st
              
Recommendation based in part on previous work by FATF and the 
UNODC, as well as two previous articles by the authors hereof.21 
II. WHY EXISTING U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES ARE 
NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT 
Previous articles have discussed why it is difficult for banks and 
other financial institutions to effectively monitor and detect TBML,22 and 
why a 41
st
 Recommendation on TBML could effectively enhance           
international cooperation on combating it.23 To effectively combat TBML, 
all parties involved in international trade, including but not limited to     
exporters, importers, financial firms other than banks (e.g., factors and other 
non-bank financiers), and those involved in the transport of goods, defined 
as “traders” in the FATF TBML Best Practices Paper,24 must implement 
preventive measures against money laundering. Such measures would    
include customer due diligence and enhanced due diligence, adequate    
record-keeping, dedicated AML and combating the financing of terrorism 
  
 20 CLARE SULLIVAN & EVAN SMITH, AUSTL. GOV’T, AUSTL. INST. CRIMINOLOGY, TRADE-
BASED MONEY LAUNDERING: RISKS AND REGULATORY RESPONSES, at iii, 20 (2011), available 
at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/rpp/100-120/rpp115.aspx. 
 21 See infra Part III; Ross Delston & Stephen Walls, Reaching Beyond Banks: How to 
Target Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Outside the Financial Sec-
tor, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 85, 92–98 (2009), reprinted in 2011 ANNUAL REVIEW OF 
INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW & PRACTICE (James E. Byrne & Christopher S. Byrnes eds., 
2011); see also Ross Delston, The 41st FATF Recommendation: Why Preventive Measures 
Targeting Trade-Based Money Laundering Should Reach Beyond Banks, MONEY 
LAUNDERING BULLETIN, March 2008, at 8 [hereinafter Delston, Preventive Measures]; Ross 
Delston, The 41st FATF Recommendation: Why Banks Alone Cannot Prevent Trade-Based 
Money Laundering, ACAMS TODAY, July–Aug. 2008, at 42 [hereinafter Delston, Banks]. 
 22 See THE WOLFSBERG GROUP, THE WOLFSBERG TRADE FINANCE PRINCIPLES 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/pdf/WG_Trade_Finance_Principles_Final 
_(Jan_09).pdf (noting that up to eighty percent of international trade takes place under so-
called “Open Account” transactions between buyers and sellers, which generally provide a 
bank with little or no information regarding the amount of the transaction, even omitting the 
identities of those from whom and to whom the money is being transferred in many instanc-
es). See generally Delston, Preventive Measures, supra note 21; Delston, Banks, supra note 
21. 
 23 See Delston & Walls, supra note 21.  
 24 FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 2 (“The term trader refers to anyone 
who facilitates the exchange of goods and related services across national borders, interna-
tional boundaries or territories. This would also include a corporation or other business unit 
organized and operated principally for the purpose of importing or exporting goods and 
services (e.g. import/export companies).”). 
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(CFT) compliance staff, and policies, procedures and internal controls, 
training, as well as reporting suspicious transactions. 
A. Enhanced Inspections Are Critical but Impractical as a            
Comprehensive Solution 
A recent conviction in Ireland highlights why effective action on 
TBML requires the participation of more entities than just financial        
institutions.25 That case uncovered a customs fraud scheme in operation for 
at least five years, which was discovered only when customs officers 
searched a shipping container and found that the contents obviously did not 
correspond to the description on the bill of lading. As a result, the head of 
one of Ireland’s largest fruit and vegetable producers and distributers was 
sentenced to six years in jail. A perhaps more alarming case is described in 
the 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, where            
discrepancies discovered only after the physical inspection of goods from 
Dubai unraveled a TBML scheme directly involving a member of              
al-Qaeda.26 
However, increasing on-site inspections of containers cannot be a 
comprehensive response, given the cost, time delays, personnel and other 
resources needed. Screening is enhanced by voluntary initiatives such as the 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and Container Security      
(C-TPAT) Initiative run by Customs and Border Protection27 and statistics 
monitoring teams such as the Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) run by  
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).28 However, these screening 
enhancement efforts do not create a sufficient deterrent to laundering money 
through the international trade system. Combating TBML, terrorist         
financing, and thereby terrorism itself, is too crucial to our nation’s security 
to entrust to foreign customs agents or rely on the limited deterrence created 
by a voluntary program. 
  
 25 See Ireland Garlic Scam: Paul Begley Jailed for Six Years, BBC (Mar. 9, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17320460 (reporting on a recent importation 
scam). 
 26 See 2004 INCSR, supra note 10, at 22 (detailing the discovery of a TBML scheme after 
inspections of cosmetics and other goods being shipped through Dubai).  
 27 See C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/ (last visited Apr. 22, 
2012); CSI: Container Security Initiative, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http:// 
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/csi/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  
 28 See Trade Transparency Unit, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/trade-transparency/ (last visited April 22, 2012); see also Homeland 
Security Investigations Trade Transparency Unit, 7 CORNERSTONE REPORT, no. 3, 2011, at 
3–4 (2011). 
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B. Trade Transparency Units Are Valuable, but Currently Cannot 
Generate Enough Information to Deter TBML 
TTUs are excellent at detecting blatant documentary fraud and 
monitoring other reporting discrepancies between two cooperating customs 
authorities, but are not sufficient to detect documentary anomalies on all 
sides of the transaction. A recent case involving a TBML scheme in       
operation for at least ten years illustrates this difficulty.29 The Angel Toy 
Company, based in Irvine, California, laundered Colombian and Mexican 
drug money through purchases of toys manufactured in and exported from 
China to third countries, presumably in Latin America.30 The company’s 
reputation among international criminals for laundering drug money led 
prosecutors to begin an investigation in 2008, and, in January 2012, two 
company officers pleaded guilty to charges of structuring currency       
transactions to avoid reporting requirements.31  
In addition to difficulties with more complex trade transactions, 
such as those involving a variety of entities in four or more countries, the 
TTU statistics can be flawed due to fraudulent documentation by those  
attempting to avoid export/import fees and taxes through simple customs 
fraud. It would also be difficult to detect statistically the small number of 
terrorists using international trade to transfer profits or illicit goods,        
including arms and munitions, as well as weapons of mass destruction and 
related precursor materials.  
Despite plans announced by ICE in its Fiscal Year 2013            
Congressional Budget Justification to nearly double the number of TTUs 
with a slightly reduced overall budget,32 TTUs remain bilateral in nature, 
and accordingly have limited scope, and must be implemented on a country-
  
 29 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office Cent. Dist. Cal, Owners of Los Angeles Toy 
Company Sentenced to Federal Prison for Role in International Scheme to Launder Money 
for Drug Traffickers (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/2012/ 
021.html [hereinafter Owners of L.A. Toy Company Sentenced] 
 30 Dalina Castellanos, Toy Firm Owners get 3 Years in Money Laundering Case, L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 31, 2012), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/01/toy-company-1.html; 
see also ANGEL TOY, http://angeltoy.com/manufacturing.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) 
(explaining that “[o]nce the stuffed animals are produced, they are transported from our 
factories to ports in Qingdao or Shanghai”). 
 31 Owners of L.A. Toy Company Sentenced, supra note 29; see also Castellanos, supra 
note 30.  
 32 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
SALARIES AND EXPENSES: FISCAL YEAR 2013 CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION, 22 (2013), avail-
able at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-congressional-budget-justification-
fy2013.pdf (stating that “in FY 2013, Domestic Investigations will . . . establish Trade 
Transparency Units in the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia” to add to the six TTUs in 
existence, with an overall budget reduction of $55.6 million).  
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by-country basis, a costly and time-consuming process.33 New multilateral 
customs initiatives, such as those being negotiated under the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP),
 34 could address the bilateral nature and quality of      
reporting issues that currently exist for TTUs, but whether such a           
multilateral effort will ever be effectively implemented remains to be seen. 
III. THE LANGUAGE OF A 41
ST
 RECOMMENDATION ON TBML  
As discussed above, the acknowledged threat of TBML requires   
international anti-money laundering action that reaches beyond banks. A 
previous article by the authors outlined the necessary compliance programs, 
customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting that could   
contribute greatly to the international fight against TBML.35 To build on 
those suggestions, a new 41
st
 Recommendation is proposed here, using the 
definition of “traders” found in the FATF TBML Best Practices Paper36 and 
based on the approach taken in the existing FATF Recommendations:37 
Recommendation 41, Trade-Based Money Laundering 
Countries should have measures in place to monitor, detect and prosecute 
abuses of the international trade system on the basis of the Vienna and Pa-
lermo Conventions, and should ensure that one or more competent domes-
tic authorities are authorized to supervise traders. Countries should ensure 
that effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions are available to these 
authorities to deal with persons who fail to comply with AML/CFT re-
quirements under this Recommendation, fail to declare or make false dec-
larations on customs forms or on any documentation related to the im-
port/export of such goods, including bills of lading, invoices, warehouse 
receipts, and letters of credit. In cases where the goods or the underlying 
import/export transaction are related to terrorist financing, money launder-
ing or predicate offences, countries should also adopt measures, including 
legislative measures consistent with Recommendation 4, that would enable 
the confiscation of such goods. 
Domestic authorities should be empowered to inspect shipments with 
technology commensurate with the risks of money laundering and financ-
ing of terrorism, collect and review related documents, collect and analyze 
  
 33 SULLIVAN & SMITH, supra note 20, at 21. 
 34 Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outl 
ines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) (“TPP countries also 
have agreed on the importance of close cooperation between authorities to ensure the effec-
tive implementation and operation of the agreement as well as other customs matters.”).  
 35 See generally Delston & Walls, supra note 21. 
 36 FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 2. 
 37 For example, Recommendation 32 on cash couriers, and Recommendations 22, 23 and 
28 which apply to Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions, among others. 
FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 17, at 19–21, 23–24, 25. 
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information gathered by domestic law enforcement authorities, and moni-
tor trade flows on a real-time basis. Commensurate with the risks identi-
fied, countries should implement new inspection technologies relating to 
the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. 
Traders should be required to implement programmes against trade-based 
money laundering and terrorist financing that encompass the following:  
 
a) Adequate internal controls, including group-wide training and infor-
mation-sharing, set out in Recommendation 18; 
b) Customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements consistent 
with Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15 and 17 for import and export 
transactions in an amount equal to or greater than the applicable desig-
nated threshold; and  
c) Report suspicious transactions as set out in Recommendations 20 and 
21. 
An interpretive note to this 41
st
 Recommendation could draw heavily from 
red flags and other issues discussed in the 2006 FATF report entitled Trade 
Based Money Laundering,38 the 2008 FATF Best Practices Paper on Trade-
Based Money Laundering,39 and the U.S. FFIEC BSA/AML Examination 
Manual (2010),40 with other material from the interpretive notes for those 
Recommendations cited in the text of the proposed Recommendation.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
As noted by the Australian Institute of Criminology in its report   
entitled Trade-Based Money Laundering: Risks and Responses, a regime 
along the lines proposed here would precipitate a significant expansion of 
resources and oversight responsibilities for customs authorities.41 But we 
should not be surprised if a problem this large fails to offer easy solutions, 
nor should we be surprised that no jurisdiction is willing to be the first to 
implement such a regime. Yet these two factors make an international    
  
 38 See FATF TBML REPORT, supra note 5 (discussing typologies, red-flag indicators, and 
capacity building); see also Delston & Walls, supra note 21, at 103–16 (discussing red flags 
and impact on TBML compliance programs). 
 39 See FATF TBML BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12 (discussing capacity building and 
awareness raising, typologies and red-flag indicators, domestic mechanisms to link the work 
of relevant authorities, data protection and privacy, international co-operation, and legitimate 
trading activities).  
 40 See Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, FED. FIN. INST. 
EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_manual/manual_ 
online.htm (last visited May 5, 2012). 
 41 SULLIVAN & SMITH, supra note 20, at 23. 
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cooperative body like FATF an ideal forum to implement an international 
solution to a problem that is international in scope and requires a high    
degree of mutual cooperation.  
A 41
st
 FATF Recommendation on TBML, including specific    
guidance on customer due diligence and implementing the TBML          
obligations identified by the UNODC,42 would allow the international 
community to mobilize against abuse of the international trade system in a 
manner beyond the capabilities of any single state or customs authority. 
Given the size and scope of the problem, the difficulty in concluding a  
binding, TBML-specific international convention, and the widespread 
recognition of the risks entailed, the time is now for a 41
st
 FATF            
Recommendation on trade-based money laundering. 
  
 42 U.N. AML Report, supra note 13, ¶ 36 (identifying obligations such as identifying, 
investigating, and prosecuting trade-based money-laundering offenses).  
